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Abstract: Although Deep Neural Networks(DNNs) have achieved successful applications in
many fields, they are vulnerable to adversarial examples.Adversarial training is one of the most
effective methods to improve the robustness of DNNs, and it is generally considered as solving a
saddle point problem that minimizes risk and maximizes perturbation.Therefore, powerful
adversarial examples can effectively replicate the situation of perturbation maximization to solve
the saddle point problem.The method proposed in this paper approximates the output of DNNs in
the input neighborhood by using the Taylor expansion, and then optimizes it by using the
Lagrange multiplier method to generate adversarial examples. If it is used for adversarial training,
the DNNs can be effectively regularized and the defects of the model can be improved.
1 Introduction
At present, deep neural networks (DNNs) are applied successfully in many fields such as
bioinformatics [1,2], speech recognition [3,4], and computer vision [5,6]. However, recent work
has shown that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial examples. Szeigy et al. [7] first observed
adversarial examples of DNNs in the image classification domain. An adversarial example is a
natural image maliciously added by tiny perturbations that is almost imperceptible to human eyes,
which can fool the DNNs to produce an incorrect prediction. An typical example is in the
autonomous driving domain, where a traffic signs crafted as an adversarial example, can
successfully deceive the DNN of autonomous car, which can cause serious traffic accidents.
Adversarial examples attract a lot of interest of researchers and many typical attack methods
are proposed to generate them such as FGSM [8], JSMA [9], Deepfool[10], C&W [11], PGD [12],
M-DI2-FGSM[13] etc. Meanwhile, some defense methods are also suggested. Adversarial training
is first proposed by Szeigy et al.[15] , which is one of the most effective defense proved by [z1] so
far. Ruitong Huang et al. [12,15,16] from optimization viewpoint, consider adversarial training is
a min-max optimization problem. The key to address this problem is to generate more powerful
adversarial examples to maximize the adversarial loss of DNNs. Based on this idea, we propose a
novel approach termed as TEAM (Taylor Expansion-based Adversarial Method) that are different
from previous proposed methods.
The generation of adversarial examples is usually be modeled as an optimization problem of
the loss function with respect to the input. However, it is very difficult to solve this optimization
problem due to the high nonlinearity of DNNs. Therefore, the current typical gradient-based
methods, such as FGSM, JSMA, Deepfool, C&W, PGD, M-DI2-FGSM etc., all transform it into
an easily optimized objective function, which generates the adversarial examples through one or
more steps of iteration[9,11]. The objective functions of these methods all depend on the first-order
gradient information of DNNs. As a result, FGSM and Deepfool are prone to fall into the local
optimal value. JSMA recalculates the gradient every iteration in the last hidden layer. C&W also
iterates on the selection of the super parameter. PGD will lose the learned information during the
iteration.
Our proposed TEAM is to leverage a quadratic function to replace the nonlinear part of
DNNs in a small neighbourd of the input example by Taylor expansion. Since it approximates the
input-output mapping relationship of DNNs in a tiny neighbourhood of the input, the problem of
generation of DNNs’ adversarial examples is translate to the problem of generation of quadratic
functions’ adversarial examples, which is equivalent from the view of classification. After that, we
further thanslate it to a dual problem on the basis of Lagrange multiplier method. At this point, we
turn the original problem into a convex problem which is more easy to resolve.
Compared with the one-step attack method like FGSM, our method is closer to the optimal
solution, which makes adversarial examples more powerful. Compared with other multi-step
attack methods, our method has advantages in calculation accuracy, and can avoid falling into
local optimization. Therefore, our method can not only generate powerful adversarial examples,
but also significantly reduce the computing complexity.
Transferability is an important property of adversarial examples, which is used by adversary
to launch a black-box attack. That is, the adversarial examples generated by one DNNs is equally
effective on another DNNs. Florian et al.[17] have deeply explored the transferability of
adversarial examples. Xie et al.[13] comprehensively studied and analyzed the transferability of
adversarial examples generated by different attack methods. Hence, in our experiments, besides
attack success rates, transferability is another measure to evaluate our method compared with
other methods. In experimental results, the attack success rates of our method could achieve 100%
both on MNIST and CIFAR10 data sets. In addition, transferability of our method could achieve
68% and 65% on MNIST and CIFAR10 data sets respectively, which are higher than other
methods.
Equipped with above perspective, we make the following contributions:
(1) Through analysis, we found that adversarial examples need to keep good concealment, so
effective adversarial examples must be obtained in a small perturbation range. For this
reason, we only need to apply Taylor theorem in the small field ( pL norms constraints)
of the input example, generating a quadratic Taylor expansion which has similar output
to DNNs. Then, the Lagrange multiplier method is used to construct the dual function for
optimization. Compared with all the previous methods, this method can avoid being
trapped by local optimizations, and use dual function to optimize can get more effective
adversarial examples.
(2) We systematically evaluated the selection of the objective function to construct
adversarial examples, and proved through experiments that our method can generate
effective adversarial examples whether DNNs smooth the gradient for defense or not.
(3) We propose using our high-confidence adversarial examples in adversarial training test,
and prove that our method overperforms the most representative attack methods available
nowadays in the aspect of. improving the robustness of DNNs and the transferability
adversarial examples
Experimental evaluation was conducted on MNIST and CIFAR10 data seta. To make it
easier for its researchers to use our work to evaluate the robustness of other defense systems,
The complete code is available at https://github.com/zhangximin2019/zhangximin.
This paper is organized as follows: Sec. 2 introduces background on the fundamentals of
DNNs and the most representative attack methods available nowadays. Sec. 3 describes
TEBM and another method based on the Gauss-Newton Method in detail, providing
mathematical derivation and algorithm. Sec. 4 discusses the inner maximization problem and
outer minimization problem in adversarial training. Sec.5 carries on the experiment
evalueation, with experimental analysis to verify the effectiveness of our method. In Sec. 6
briefly describes the related work of this paper. In Sec. 7 we conclude our work.
2 Background
This section provides background on our work, covering the fundamentals of DNNs and the
most representative attack methods available nowadays.
2.1 Deep Neural Networks and Notation
DNNs can generally be represented as a multidimensional
function :F X Y , XX stands for d -dimensional input variable, Y Y is a
h -dimensional probability vector which stands for Confidence of h classes. An N -layer DNNs
receives an input X and produces the corresponding output as follows:
( ) (2) (1)( ) ( ( ( )))NF X F F F X  (1)
( )iF represents the computational output of layer i of DNNs. These layers can be convolutional,
pooled, or other forms of neural network layers. The last layer of DNNs is usually the Softmax
layer, defined as ( )
1
( ) =Softmax( ) exp( ) / exp( )
mN
i i i ii
F Z Z z z  , ( 1)( )NZ F   is the
output vector of the previous layer (also known as the last hidden layer). The final prediction label
is obtained by 1argmax ( ) i m iy F X , where ( ) Softmax( )F X Z .
2.2 Adversarial Examples of DNNs
Szegedy et al. [7] first found the existence of adversarial examples in DNNs. More formally, in
the space m nR , we think of an image X which size is m n as a point. Our goal is to find a
point , pX X C     which is in the constraint and is close enough to X . Such point
X  is called the adversarial example. This X  and X belong to the same category from the
perspective of human eye, but the subtle perturbation  deceives DNNs into judging it as a
different class from X , i.e
( ) ( ) . .F X F X y s t y y      (2)
In general, the perturbation  is constrained by the pL norm( 0, 2,p  ), pX X C   .
2.3 Threat Models in Deep Learning
There are a number of methods to generate adversarial examples, but they are all have
constraints. Since the capability of adversarial examples or the robustness of the attack is based
upon what adversary is allowed to do. Without such limitation, adversary can replace the given
image with any image, violating the definition of adversarial examples. To this end, we define
these assumptions as threat models, which typically include attack targets and attack capabilities.
(1) Adversarial Goals
Adversarial goals in threat models can be defined as a specific formula that needs to be
detected and defended. In DNNs, the classification of adversarial Goals is helpful for us to define
this specific formula. Therefore, in threat models, the classification of adversarial goals is very
important. In this paper, adversarial goals are divided into two categories:
a) Untargeted attack: misclassify adversarial examples to any incorrect class
b) Targeted attack: misclassify adversarial examples to specified incorrect class
In this paper, both untargeted attack and targeted attack are based on the change of
confidence, and the method in this paper is the first attack method to reduce confidence through
optimization method from the mathematical perspective to generate adversarial examples.
(2) Adversarial Capabilities
Adversarial examples can also be divided into white box attack and black box attack
according to how much information adversary has about the target DNNs. The so-called white box
attack means that adversary knows everything about DNNs, including training data, activation
function, topology structure, weight coefficient and so on. The black box attack assumes that
adversary cannot obtain the internal information of the target DNNs and can only obtain the
output of the model, including labels and confidence.
Because the gradient information of target DNNs needs to be mastered, the method in this
paper belongs to white box attack. However, since adversarial examples generated by the method
in this paper is highly transferable, it is easy to build the agent DNNs locally through the method
in the paper [18] to successfully realize the black box attack.
2.4 Attack algorithms
We selected some typical gradient-based methods to compare with the methods proposed in
this paper. The existing typical methods include FGSM, JSMA, Deepfool, C&W, PGD,
M-DI2-FGSM, etc.
(1) FGSM
Goodfellow et al.[8] presents a method for rapidly generating adversarial examples under L
distance called FGSM(Fast Gradient Sign Method）:
sign( ( ( ; ), ))XX X J F X y      (3)
where J is the loss function,  is the perturbation limit on the sign gradient direction ( )sign .
FGSM has the advantages of low computational complexity and the ability to generate a large
number of adversarial examples in a short time.
（2）JSMA
Papernotet al.[9] proposed a targeted attack method under 0L distance. According to the
adversarial saliency maps, the input components were ranked in descending order, and the
components with strong adversarial saliency were selected to add perturbation  . For the target
class t , adversarial saliency map of component S(X, t)[ ]i is defined as :
( )( )
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where ( ) /F j i ijJ F X x     represents DNNs Jacobian matrix. During each iteration, the
component iX of the maximum value of the adversarial saliency value is selected to increase by a
constant offset until the example is misclassified.
(3)Deepfool
Moosav-dezfooli et al.[10] proposed the Deepfool method, which employs linear
approximation for gradient iterative attack. For a binary classifier, the following iterative process
can be used to describe:
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(5)
Here iX  is the adversarial examples for the -thi iteration, 0X X  . 2( ) / ( )i if X f X  is
the estimated distance between iX  and the decision boundary ( )if X  . 2( ) / ( )i if X f X  
is the gradient direction of iX  toward the decision boundary.
(4) C&W
Carlini and Wagner proposed a targeted iterative attack method based on gradient descent.
Based on their further studies[11,19,20], C&W attacks are effective against most existing defenses.
They modeled the process of generating the adversarial examples as the following optimization
problem, minimizing the disturbance while maximizing the model classification error:
min ( )
p
c g X     (6)
If and only if ( )F X y  , ( ) 0g X   . Through experimental evaluation, they found that the
most effective function g was:
( ) max(max(Softmax( ) ) Softmax( ) , )i t
i y
g X X X k
     (7)
Where k is the constant that controls confidence.
(5) PGD
Aleksander et al.[12] explained the process of generating adversarial examples as a simple
one-step solution to solve the internal maximization problem of saddle point problem. Based on
this, they proposed a derivative method of FGSM, called PGD. The essence of this method is to
project gradient descent on the loss function:
( sign( ( ( ; ), )))X S XX X J f X y      (8)
(6) M-DI2-FGSM
Momentum and diverse inputs are two completely different ways to alleviate the overfitting
phenomenon. Xie et al.[13] combined them naturally to form a much stronger attack, i.e., Momentum
Diverse Inputs Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (M-DI2-FGSM):
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g g
L T X p y
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3 Our approach
We present algorithm algorithm1 to find appropriate perturbation  under pL condition.
For the untargeted attack, the algorithm minimizes the confidence of classifying an AEs towards
its correct class. However, it maximizes the classification confidence toward a target class in the
targeted attack.
To achieve this goal, we conducted quadratic Taylor Expansion to approximate the
complicated input-output mapping relationship of DNNs in a small neighbourhood of input
example. Then, we used the Lagrange multiplier method to construct the dual function that
produces the perturbation  .
For untargeted attack, it is to reduce the confidence of the correct output class; for targeted
attack, it is to improve the confidence of the target class. Therefore, the core of the proposed
method is constructing a quadratic Taylor expansion to approximate the complicated
input output projection of DNNs in a small neighbourhood of the input example by using gradient
information. Then, the Lagrange multiplier method is used to construct the dual function and
calculate the extreme value to obtain the perturbation  .
First, our method calculates the gradient information of DNNs by considering that the output
of the last hidden layer (before and after Softmax layer) of DNNs can both provide gradient
information of DNNs. In contrast, the output after the Softmax layer is the normalisation of the
output before the softmax. The Softmax layer smooth the gradient. The author of [9] insist on
using the last hidden layer output (before the softmax) for the calculation. Indeed, the extreme
variations introduced by the logistic regression computed between these two layers leads to
absolute derivative values. This reduces the quality of information on how different inputs activate
the neurons according to[9]. For evaluating our method, We extracted "Logist vector" from the
outputs of the last hidden layer (before the softmax layer), and "Confidence vector" from the
Softmax output.
By considering that we obtain AEs using a small neighbourhood of the input. In this
neighbourhood, DNNs can be easily trapped by local optimization. That because of it still highly
nonlinear even if we used multi-step iterations methods. To avoid this problem, we used quadratic
Taylor Expansion to approximate the complicated input-output mapping relationship of DNNs in a
small neighbourhood of the input. A simple quadratic function replaces the nonconvex and
nonlinear part of DNNs. Then the Lagrange multiplier method is used to construct the dual
function and transform the original problem into a convex problem. In this way, we obtained the
effective perturbation value to generate hight attack AEs.
3.1 Problem Formulation
In this section, we define the objective functions and the optimisation model for the targeted
and untargeted attacks. To obtain AEs from the last hidden layer of DNNs, we considered the
output of each neuron of the last hidden layer. Formally, this output is the logist value of iz that
assigned to the class m at the neuron i .
For a given input X , The highest value of iz decides the class label m that corresponds
to X according to eq.11:
argmax( ( ))i
i
m z X (11)
This section will choose the objective function and establish the optimization model
according to the attack target in 2.2. Assume that adversarial examples are generated on the last
hidden layer. The output of each neuron in the last hidden layer of DNNs is the logist value
assigned to the class that the neuron represents, and the predict label
of X is 1,...,arg max ( )i m iy z . That is, the greater the value of iz , the more likely it is to be
classified as the -thi class, and vice versa. Since the purpose of adversarial examples, X  is to
add a small amount of distortion  that fool the DNNs. Thus, our goal is to find  that ensure
smaller value for ( )mz X  .In other words, the low probability of affecting the correct class
label $m$ to the input increases the probability of DNNs misclassification.
Alternatively, we can generate AEs using the normalised last DNNs layer outputs (softmax
output). Let us denote the softmax output as ( )jf X to distinguish it from the pure last DNNs layer
output ( )jz X . The difference between the outputs before and after applying the Softmax is that
the drop in ( )jf X corresponds to the rise in ( )ii j f X . Intuitively, reducing the confidence
of the correct class at the Softmax layer is recommended to generate AEs. Our results show no
significant difference between using the pure versus normalised last DNNs layer outputs. We can
say that our method is more adaptable than the first-order gradient information based attack
represented by JSMA.
We considered the problem of obtaining the optimal perturbation  as an optimisation
problem. For that, we defined three different kinds of objective functions:
I. 1 z ( )mT X   and 4 ( )mT f X   represent the output of the correct class of X 
at the last hidden layer before and after applying the Softmax, respectively. We can obtain an AEs,
once a minimum value of 1T or 4T is obtained.
II. 2 ( )tT z X   and 5 ( )tT f X   represent the output of the target class of X 
before and after the Softmax. We can obtain an AEs once 2T or 5T reachs its maximum.
III. 3 ( ) max ( ( ))t i t iT z X z X     and 6 ( ) max ( ( ))t i t iT f X f X    
represent the difference between the target class output value and the maximum class output value
at the last hidden layer before and after applying the Softmax. Once 3T and 6T reache their
maximum value, the probability of generating targeted adversarial example is maximum.
（1） Untargeted Atteck
IV. Our goal is to find $\delta$ that minimizes (X + δ)mf that keep the AEs untractable.
Formaly, we are looking for finding the perturbation value  for the image X , we can write:
1 4
n
minimize
s.t. (X + δ) , X + δ [0,1] ,
p
T or T
F m C   (12)
（2） Targeted Attack
Suppose t is the target class, then the goal is to find the $\delta$ that maximizes (X + δ)tf
within the constraint:
2 3 5 6
n
maxmize  
s.t.      (X + δ) , X + δ [0,1] ,
p
T or T or T or T
F t C   (13)
This paper studies a special input case, that is, the benign sample X is not a meaningful
natural picture, it may be a pure black or white picture, or it may be a meaningless messy code.
Our adversarial examples can trick DNNs and classify adversarial examples into our target class
t . We add a condition (X)F i to equation (13).
3.2 Generate adversarial examples based on the Taylor expansion
We propose a novel adversarial example generation algorithm1, that proved its effectiveness
through experiments. Remember that both objective function iz and if presented in section 3.1
refers to the extracted gradient information. Therefore, for convenience of narration, we denote
if and if uniformly by F in this section.
We use quadratic Taylor Expansion to approximate the nonlinear part of F in the
neighbourhood of X . It is by transforming the constrained nonlinear optimisation problem into a
constrained linear optimisation problem. After that, we use Lagrange multiplier method to
construct a dual problem that finds the optimal solution within the pL norms constraints. This
process not only reduces the difficulty of solving the optimisation problem, but it also improves
the solution accuracy.
(1) Compute the gradient matrix ( )F X and Hessian matrix 2 ( )F X for the given sample
X.
1
( )
( ) mm
i n
F X
F X
X 
     
(14)
2
2 ( )( ) mm
i j n n
F X
F X
X X 
       
(15)
(2) Use Taylor expansion to approximate
mF
in the neighbourhood ( , )U X  of X .
21( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
T T
m m m m mF X F X T F X F X F X            (16)
X  is the moving point in the neighbourhood. ( )mF X  is the logist or Softmax value of X 
that is classified as the m -th class. The minimum value of logist/softmax being, maximise the
probability of misclassifying the input sample.
(3) Calculate  by using the Lagrange multiplier method: In equation (16),  is the only
unknown. Therefore, we transform the problem of generating adversarial examples into a
nonlinear optimization problem under inequality constraints:
2
min ( ) . .
p
T s t C   (17)
We construct the Lagrange function:
2
22
( , ) ( ) ( )
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
p
T T
m m m p
L T C
F X F X F X C
    
    
  
     
(18)
We transformed the nonlinear optimisation problem with inequality constraints into an
unconstrained optimisation problem. To simplify the calculations, we turned the original
problem (17) into a dual problem:
min ( ) . . 0g s t   (19)
Where the dual function ( ) inf ( , )g L   . According to the weak duality property, the
optimal value d  of equation (19) is the optimal lower bound of the original problem (17), that is,
the convex optimization problem approximates the original problem. The optimal solution of
equation (19) must satisfy the KKT condition as follows:
( ) 0
0
g 

   
(20)
Assume that when *  , *( )g  can get the minimum; when *  , *( )T  be able to
get the minimum. According to the principle of weak duality property, the optimal value of the
original problem is not less than the optimal value of the dual problem, i.e. * *( ) ( )g T  . If
the original function is a convex function and satisfies the Slater condition, then * *( ) ( )g T  .
However, due to the high nonlinearity of DNNs, 2 ( )F X is difficult to be proved as a positive
definite matrix. So we can think of * *( , )  as an approximately optimal solution to ( , )L   .
Figure 1 shows the relationship between DNNs and dual functions.
(a)MNIST (b)CIFAR10
Figure 1: The relationship between DNNs and dual functions. This picture plots the process of
generating adversarial example on MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset. For the target function 1T , with
the constant C increasing, the loss value of DNNs and the dual function changes. We can see
that the changes of DNNs and dual functions tend to be consistent.
If the obtained  satisfies the condition , ( ) ( )t yt I F X F X      , then  is the
best perturbation to generate adversarial example. In this way, we obtain the optimal solution 
for the optimization problem with inequality constraints through the Lagrange multiplier method,
thus generating the adversarial example X  .The above method can be easily extended to all
non-cyclic DNNs. The only requirement is that the activation function is differentiable, which has
been satisfied by the characteristics of BP algorithm. The whole process is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm1 Generate adversarial examples based on Taylor expansion
X is a benign example
Input: X ,C
Output: X
1: 2
2
1
( ) ( )
( ) , ( ) ,m mm m
i i jn n n
F X F X
F X F X l m
X X X 
               
2: while l m do
3:
21( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
T T
m m mT F X F X F X      
//Use Taylor expansion to approximate
mF
in the neighbourhood ( , )U X  of X
4:
221( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
T T
m m m p
L F X F X F X C           
// Construct the Lagrange function
5: min inf ( , ) . . 0L s t   
// Construct the dual problem
6:
* 2* 2(( , ) ( , ) )0 0, 0,, 0
p p
C CL            
// The KKT condition is used to find the optimal solution
7: *argmax ( )i il F X  
8: 0.01C C 
9： end while
10：return *+X 
The selection of C is also involved in generating AEs through equation (18). C is used to
constrain  . If the value of C is too large, the success rate of generating an adversarial example is
higher, but the concealment of adversarial example will be weakened, and vice versa. Therefore, the
choice of C is crucial. Empirically, the most suitable C is the minimum one which satisfies
, ( ) ( )t yt I F X F X      after solving equation (18). We verify this by running our 1T
from 0C  on the MNIST and CIFAR10 data sets separately. We plot lines in Figure 2.
(a)MNIST (b)CIFAR10
Figure 2: Change in constant C . We plot the relationship between constantC and the change of
cross entropy loss value of DNNs, when the objective function 1T generates adversarial
examples on MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset respectively.
3.3 Generate adversarial examples based on the Gauss-Newton Method
Because of the use of Taylor expansion formula, the method in 3.2 can generate effective and
highly transferable adversarial examples, but the shortcomings of this method are also very
obvious. Since the Taylor expansion formula involves the calculation of the Hessian matrix, and
the second-order term in the Hessian matrix is usually difficult to calculate or requires a large
amount of calculation, it is also not advisable to use the secant line approximation of the whole
Hessian. Therefore, we can also use gauss-newton method to simplify the calculation.
Gauss-Newton Method is a specialized method for minimizing the least squares cost
2(1 2) ( )yF X  .Given a point X , the pure form of the Gauss-Newton Method is based on
linearizing ( )yF X  to obtain
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )k T ky yR X X F X F X        (21)
and then minimizing the norm of the linearized function R :
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Assuming that the matrix ( ) ( )Ty yF X F X  is invertible, the above quadratic minimization
yields:
1 1( ( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( )k k Ty y y yF X F X F X F X       (23)
Notice that because of the high nonlinearity of DNNs, we can't prove the matrix
( ) ( )Ty yF X F X  is invertible. To ensure descent, and also to deal with the case where the
matrix ( ) ( )Ty yF X F X  is singular(as well as enhance convergence when this matrix is nearly
singular), the equation (22) is rewrited as follows:
1 1( ( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( )k k k T ky y y yF X F X F X F X          (24)
where k is a stepsize chosen by one of the stepsize rules. The matrix ( ) ( )Ty yF X F X  is a
symmetric matrix certainly, so there is a matrix minλ ( ( ) ( ) )
k T
y yF X F X I     which is a
diagonal matrix that makes ( ) ( )T ky yF X F X    positive definite. The algorithm is as
follows:
Algorithm2 Generate adversarial examples based on the Gauss-Newton
Method
X is a benign example
Input: X , Xy ,C , 0 
Output: 
1: while X Xy y  and p C  do
2:
1
( )
( ) yy
i m
F X
F X
X 
     
,
( ) ( )Ty yH F X F X  ,
minλ ( ( ) ( ) )
k T
y yF X F X I    
3:
1 1( ) ( ) ( )k k k k y yH F X F X       
4: X X  
5: return 
This is an algorithm that can generate adversarial examples quickly, but the accuracy is not
high due to the addition of the identity matrix to ensure positive definite. In other words, the
concealment of the adversarial examples generated by this algorithm is not as good as we
expected. However, we use meaningless images to generate adversarial examples, then we do not
have to worry about the problem of concealment. We'll test that experimentally. In addition, ‘our
method’ we mentioned in this paper is the method in Section 3.2.
4 Construct robust DNNs through adversarial training
For the purpose of training a robust DNNs reliably, this paper does not use the method that
directly focuses on improving the robustness against specific attacks, but first proposes specific
requirements that a robust DNNs should be satisfied. Ruitong Huang et al.[12,15,16] described this
specific requirement as a min-max optimization problem. On the one hand, we have to find an
adversarial version of a given data point X that achieves a high loss. On the other hand, we
have to train a model and find the model parameters which minimize the loss of DNNs to
adversarial examples. This is exactly the problem to construct robust DNNs through adversarial
training.
Szegedy et al.[15] first proposed to use both adversarial examples and benign examples as
training data, and the experiment proved that it is an effective method to defense adversarial
examples. Aleksander et al.[12], from the perspective of optimization, believed that adversarial
training is an optimization problem about saddle points, and they extended traditional ERM
training to robust training.
Adversarial training: Suppose ( , )trueX y D is the original training data. Adversarial
examples can be obtained under constraint  and ( )J  is the loss function. Described as
follows:
E* ( , )
|| ||
arg min max ( ( ; ), )
advtrue
adv
X y D true
X X
J f X y

 

  
     (24)
It can be found that (24) is a saddle point problem, a combination of an inner maximization
problem and an outer minimization problem. The inner maximization problem is to find
adversarial examples that achieves a high loss. The outer minimization problem is to find the
model parameters that can minimize the adversarial loss under some kind of adversarial attack.
Current work on adversarial examples usually focuses on specific defensive mechanisms, or on
attacks against such defenses[12].An important feature of min-max optimization problem is that
attaining small adversarial loss gives a guarantee that targeted attack cannot fool DNNs. By
definition, it is possible to construct a robust DNNs which can defense all kinds of attacks. Hence,
adversarial training is an optimal balance between model accuracy and robustness.
Equation (24) defines the goal that an ideal DNNs should achieve, and quantifies its
robustness. When E approaching infinity, the corresponding DNNs has perfect robustness
against specified attack. This section studies the structure of adversarial training under the
background of DNNs. These studies will lead us to use DNNs training to produce DNNs that are
highly resistant to a wide range of adversarial attacks. Hence, we now focus our attention on
obtaining a good solution to Equation (24).
4.1 Inner maximization problem
The inner maximization problem corresponds to constructing valid adversarial examples,
which is a non-concave internal maximum problem. Since this problem requires us to maximize a
non-concave function, this is difficult to deal with. Our method approximates the output of the
non-concave function in the input neighbourhood through the Taylor expansion function, and then
we turn this second order unction into a convex optimization problem by using the dual problem.
Our method is more conducive to finding the extreme value within the constraint range and
avoiding falling into the local optimal solution, which is exactly the defect of the existing typical
attack methods.
In order to explain that our method can solve the inner maximization problem effectively, we
take MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset as examples, and randomly pick up the pictures that can be
correctly classified by DNNs for testing.
Experiment in Section 5 showed that, as we had expected, our method which uses the
second-order Taylor expansion function to approximate the output of DNNs, and then uses the
dual function to transform not only avoid falling into the local optimal value, and find the global
optimal solution within the constraint range, but also make sure that the point X found by the
second-order function can also be input into DNNs to get the extreme value.
4.2 Outer minimization problem
The previous discussion shows that the inner maximization problem can be solved
successfully by using our method. In order to train the adversarial network, we also need to solve
the outer minimization problem of equation (6), that is, to find the model parameters to minimize
the adversarial loss.
The main method to minimize the loss function is stochastic gradient descent (SGD) when
training DNNs. An effective way to calculate the gradient of the outer optimization problem is to
calculate the gradient of the loss function at the maximum value of the inner problem. This
corresponds to adding the adversarial examples to the original training data set in the adversarial
training. Of course, it is not clear that this is a valid descent direction for the min-max
optimization problem. However, for continuously differentiable functions ,the Danskin theorem -
a classical optimization theorem - states that this is indeed true[12], and that the gradient of the
inner maximization problem corresponds to descent directions for the min-max optimization
problem. In 5.2, we will prove the effectiveness of the our method for adversarial training through
experiments.
5 Evaluation
We now use our experimental setup to answer the following questions:(1) Vertical
comparison between all objective functions on different dataset;(2) Horizontal comparison
between FGSM, JSMA, Deepfool, C&W, PGD, M-DI2-FGSM and our method on different
dataset;(3) Can our method improve the robustness of DNNs through adversarial training?(4)
Whether Our adversarial examples are sufficiently transferable or not.
5.1 Experimental Setup
Our experiment will be conducted on MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset to verify the
effectiveness of our method. MNIST is a popular handwritten dataset widely used in the machine
learning community. It consists of ten classes from digit 0 to 9, containing a total of 70,000
handwritten digit images. We select 60,000 images as training data and 10,000 images as test data.
Each image is in the size of 28×28 pixels.
The CIFAR-10 dataset consists of 60000 32×32 color images in 10 classes, with 6000 images
per class. There are 50000 training images and 10000 test images. The dataset is divided into five
training batches and one test batch, each with 10000 images. The test batch contains exactly 1000
randomly-selected images from each class.
We use the standard model for each dataset. For MNIST, we use the standard 3-layer
convolutional neural network which achieves 99.2% accuracy. For cifar-10, we trained a standard
4-layer convolutional neural network which achieves 95.3% accuracy.
5.2 Evaluating Measure
We use pL , PSNR and ASR to measure the effectiveness of our method. The value of pL is
generally used to measure the global or local added perturbation, which is a measure of the
concealment of adversarial examples. In order to better evaluate the concealment of adversarial
examples, we listed "Peak Signal to Noise Ratio" (PSNR) as one of the indicators. PSNR, as the
most common and widely used objective measurement of image quality, can effectively evaluate
the concealment of adversarial examples. ASR stands for the probability of success in generating
adversarial examples. When ASR is not 100%, pL and PSNR are for successful attacks only.
A. Vertical comparison between objective functions
MNIST CIFAR10
   PSNR ASR    PSNR ASR
   0.91 73.03 100% 0.29 87.41 100%
   1.40 71.46 100% 0.30 87.45 100%
Table 1. Evaluation of untargeted attack by different objective functions on MNIST and CIFAR10
dataset. We show the average 2L distortion, PSNR and ASR of the objective function 1T and 4T .
MNIST CIFAR10
   PSNR ASR    PSNR ASR
Best
Case
   1.24 71.60 100% 0.39 84.83 100%
   1.74 70.27 100% 0.41 71.70 100%
   0.99 71.41 100% 0.54 82.16 100%
   1.24 70.45 100% 0.42 84.75 100%
Average
Case
   1.69 68.38 100% 0.66 82.86 100%
   1.74 69.10 75.2% 0.39 81.14 70.1%
   1.70 67.21 100% 0.54 81.30 100%
   1.61 67.98 78.5% 0.62 80.12 73.5%
Worst
Case
   2.49 65.95 100% 0.54 82.13 100%
   2.50 67.43 74.5% 0.57 80.08 69.7%
   2.24 63.75 100% 0.56 80.52 100%
   2.25 65.04 75.6% 0.61 82.14 71.2%
Table 2. Evaluation of targeted attack by different objective functions on MNIST and CIFAR10
dataset. We show the average 2L distortion, PSNR ,and ASR of the objective function 2T ， 3T ，
5T and 6T .
Table 1 and Table 2 show the experimental results. In Table 2, Best Case, Worst Case and
Average Case represent performing the attack against all incorrect classes, and then report the
target class that was least difficult to attack, most difficult to attack and a random one among the
labels that are not the correct label , respectively. We evaluated the quality and success rate of the
adversarial examples generated by six objective functions on MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset. In
untargeted attack, the only difference between 1T and 4T is that the gradient information of 1T
comes from a hidden layer at the end, while the gradient information of 4T comes from the
Softmax layer. In targeted attack, the difference between 2T ， 3T and 5T ， 6T is the same.
Experimental results show that the objective function locates at the last hidden layer and locates at
the Softmax layer doesn’t make very much difference. Under the influence of the normalization of
Softmax layer, 4T ， 5T and 6T perform even better than 1T ， 2T and 3T under the same
conditions. It suggests that in our method, the normalization caused by the Softmax layer[9] does
not reduce the quality of information about how neurons are activated by different inputs.
Therefore, whether or not the defense method smooths the gradient of DNNs[21], we can get
adversarial examples.
B. Horizontal comparison between existing classic methods and our method
To verify the effectiveness of our adversarial examples, we used JSMA, C&W, FGSM,
Deepfool and M-DI2-FGSM for comparison, where codes of JSMA, C&W, FGSM and Deepfool
come from Cleverhans[22] and the codes for PGD and M-DI2-FGSM come from the link given by
the author in the original text [12,13]. In addition, to ensure the rigor of the evaluation, we use the
same model and the same batch of test data to verify the above methods.
For FGSM, we take 0.01  . If the target class adversarial examples can be generated
within the specified step size, the adversarial examples will be returned for evaluation, otherwise it
will be regarded as a failure. As a derivative method of FGSM, PGD has an upper limit
8.0  for each pixel on the pixel scale of "0-255". For JSMA, we aim to generate adversarial
examples. We extend the constraint on perturbation, and modify the iteration termination
condition to classify as the target class successfully. That is, no matter how much perturbation is
required, we report success if the attack produce adversarial examples with the correct target label.
But JSMA is unable to run on CIFAR10 due to an inherent significant computational cost for
searching saliency map[11]. If we remove the search process, JSMA's ability to generate adversarial
examples is greatly reduced. Therefore, we did not use JSMA in the CIFAR10 experiment. Note
that CW is a bit different from the above gradient-based methods in that it is an
optimization-based attack. In this experiment, 2L norm attack in C&W is adopted, and we
set 1  , learning rate = 0.1. For Deepfool, note that in our implementation, the noise calculated
as f w w instead of f w w w , where w is the 2L norm.
In our experiment, 500 pictures that could be correctly judged by the initial model were
randomly selected from MNIST and CIFAR10 for testing. After all, if an image can be
misclassified without a perturbation, then the meaning of generate adversarial examples is lost. In
addition, in the case of target attack, we also divided adversarial examples into the best case and
the worst case according to the image quality of the adversarial examples. In other words, it is to
compare the perturbation strength superimposed by different methods to generate adversarial
examples. The results are shown in the following table.
MNIST CIFAR10
  
PSNR ASR
  
PSNR ASR
Best
Case
 飘ῥ    239.1 71.21 100% - - -
JSMA 183.5 58.54 100% - - -
 飘ῥ    1.70 67.21 100% 0.39 84.83 100%
C&W 1.04 61.66 100% 0.28 63.26 100%
 飘ῥ    1.34 70.86 100% 1.32 70.56 100%
FGSM 4.12 74.47 62.2% 1.72 64.72 100%
Average
Case
 飘ῥ    243.4 74.04 100% - - -
JSMA 199.6 58.66 100% - - -
 飘ῥ    1.84 67.21 100% 0.50 82.86 100%
C&W 2.21 60.68 96.2% 0.62 65.52 100%
 飘ῥ    2.32 70.90 100% 2.10 69.74 100%
FGSM 5.09 73.10 45.3% 1.78 63.75 89.5%
Worst
Case
 飘ῥ    332.4 72.13 100% - - -
JSMA 265.4 57.67 100% - - -
 飘ῥ    2.24 69.75 100% 0.54 82.13 100%
C&W 3.30 58.80 100% 0.35 59.54 100%
 飘ῥ    2.20 61.34 100% 3.2 65.12 100%
FGSM 5.21 65.24 38.2% 1.92 61.80 76.3%
Table 3. Comparison of three targeted attack algorithms on the MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset.
MNIST CIFAR10
   PSNR ASR    PSNR ASR
   0.91 73.03 100% 0.29 87.41 100%
   1.40 71.46 100% 0.30 87.45 100%
PGD 5.17 67.72 100% 1.63 78.76 86.49%
Deepfool 1.66 73.80 88.12% 0.16 85.20 81.44%
M-DI2-FGSM 3.14 65.12 56.6% 1.85 75.12 48.1%
Table 4. Comparison of three untargeted attack algorithms on the MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset.
We use the pL norm and PSNR value to measure the concealment after adding
perturbation. Experiments show that on different dataset, compared with the existing classical
attack methods, the adversarial examples generated by our method have better imperceptibility,
and our method can produce target class adversarial examples for any picture.
In [9], JSMA uses the last hidden layer instead of the Softmax layer to calculate the
adversarial saliency map. The essence of this approach is to iteratively modify the pixels with the
maximum derivative value until adversarial examples is generated or the number of pixels
modified exceeds the limit. The authors gave a simple example to show how small input
perturbations found using the forward derivative can induce large variations of the neural network
output， but they didn’t explain the mathematical derivation. We believe that the mathematical
basis of this method comes from the fact that in the neighbourhood of a fixed value X , DNNs
satisfy: For small  , there is F(X + δ) (δ) ( ) ( )   F X F X  . Therefore, JSMA can
generate adversarial examples by searching the adversarial saliency map.
However, authors believe that the extreme variations introduced by the Softmax layer lead to
extreme derivative values. This reduces the quality of information on how the neurons are
activated by different inputs and causes the forward derivative to loose accuracy when generating
saliency maps. Therefore they compute the forward derivative of the network using the last hidden
layer instead of the Softmax layer. According to equation (3), the author selected the pixel with
the maximum value of ( , )S X t , but essentially wanted to find the pixel with the maximum value
of ( ) /t iF X X  as the pixel most conducive to classification as the target class t after adding
perturbation. However, without the normalization of the Softmax layer, the author cannot
guarantee that the increase of ( ) /t iF X X  will bring the decrease of ( ) /t ij i F X X   . So
the greater the value of ( , )S X t doesn't mean the greater the value of ( ) /t iF X X  .This
means that the pixels selected in the above equation are not technically the key pixels in the
targeted attack. We have reason to believe that this is why the capability of JSMA is not as good
as we expected. However, our method overcomes this disadvantage. Whether it is in the last
hidden layer or in the Softmax layer, the our method can effectively modify pixel points and
effectively generating adversarial examples.
In [11], C&W is committed to solving minimize ( ) . . [0,1]
n
p
c f X s t X       .
The authors use binary search to determine the value of constant c , which is a mechanical search
method that is far less accurate and flexible than the Lagrange multiplier method we use. At the
same time, C&W uses 1 (tanh( ) 1)2i i iw x    to expand the search space. Admittedly, this
method is very conducive to searching more powerful adversarial examples, but it will also bring a
very large search cost. While our method can be successful without having to pay such a high
price.
In [12], PGD transforms constrained optimization problem into unconstrained optimization
problem, which is easy to implement and suitable for solving large-scale optimization problems to
generate effective adversarial examples. However, in order to ensure the effectiveness of iteration,
it takes a long time to calculate the projection of iteration points and the convergence rate is slow.
In addition, when PGD iterates the iteration point from outside to inside of the constraint through
Equation (8), part of the iteration information is inevitably lost. In our paper, after approximating
the input output mapping relationship of DNNs by using quadratic Taylor expansion, the dual
function is constructed by using Lagrange multiplier method to optimize and generate adversarial
examples. The Lagrange multiplier method can also transform unconstrained optimization
problems into constrained optimization problems. However, unlike the projected gradient descent
algorithm, the Lagrange multiplier method does not lose iteration information due to iteration, so
the optimization results are more accurate.
Both Deepfool and FGSM often get trapped in local optimum due to their algorithmic
characteristics, so the global optimal solution cannot be obtained. In this paper, quadratic Taylor
expansion is used to approximate the input output mapping relationship of DNNs, which can
effectively skip the local optimum. M-DI2-FGSM combines momentum and diverse inputs
naturally to form an attack with stronger transferability, but experiments have proved that its ASR
is not ideal.
C. Generate synthetic digits
Based on the above experiments, we found that we can make any picture into adversarial
examples of target class, this theory is also applicable to meaningless pictures. [9] and [11] have
both done such experiments. They use all-black image and all-white image to generate adversarial
examples that make no sense to humans but misclassified by DNNs . Here is the result.
Figure 5: Targeted attack for the MNIST where the starting image is totally black or white.
For random synthetic digits in [9] ,one can clearly recognize the target digit, but method in Section
3.3 does not have this flaw. For random synthetic digits in [11], although the perturbation is very
small, its calculation cost is very large, which is greatly inferior to the method in Section 3.3.
6 Related work
Since Szeigy et al.[7] discovered adversarial examples, the safety of DNNs[24] has become an
active research topic. The researchers classified the attack and discussed the adversarial
capabilities[25,26]. Szegedy et al.[7] proposed a box-constrained LBFGS method to generate
adversarial examples. Goodfellow et al.[14] proposed FGSM to generate adversarial examples
efficiently by performing a single gradient step. Kurakin et al.[23] extended it to an iterative
version, and found that the adversarial examples also exist in the physical world. Dong et al.[27]
proposed a broad class of momentum-based iterative algorithms to boost the transferability of
adversarial examples.
The above work calculates the gradient of DNNs to generate adversarial examples[7,9,14,28,29].
These work calculates the gradient not to update the weight of DNNs to improve the network, but
to update the input and then make DNNs misclassify. They first define the cost function for the
output of DNNs and then optimize the cost function to generate adversarial examples. However,
these cost functions are often difficult to calculate or have to bear a large computational cost to
optimize. Unlike these methods, our method uses a quadratic Taylor expansion to approximate the
complicated input output mapping relationship of DNNs in a small neighbourhood of the input
example directly. This is an equation that can directly find the extremum in the neighborhood,
which is more accurate and requires less computational cost. Therefore, our method can generate
adversarial examples which are very effective under both white-box and black-box settings.
The existence of adversarial examples reveals the vulnerability of DNNs. In order to improve
the robustness of DNNs, researchers have proposed many methods of square defense adversarial
examples.[14,30] proposed to use both adversarial examples and benign examples as training data
to increase the robustness of DNNs. Tram`er et al.[31] proposed ensemble adversarial training,
which augments training data with perturbations transferred from other models, in order to
improve the robustness of DNNs. We recommend using counter training as a defense. Adversarial
training requires a large number of effective adversarial examples to be generated at low cost,
which is the main purpose of this paper. Min-max optimization problem is considered in
confrontational training[32,33]. However, the results mentioned in [32,30] are different from those in
our paper. Firstly, the authors believes that the inner maximization problem is difficult to solve,
and the innovation of the method in this paper overcomes this problem. We approximate the
output of DNNs, then the Lagrange multiplier method is used to construct the dual function for
optimization. It is proved theoretically and experimentally that our method can obtain the optimal
solution for the inner maximization problem. Secondly, they only considered first-order
adversarial, and we also experimented with multi-step iterative methods. Furthermore, although
the experiments in [33] produced promising results, they were evaluated only on the basis of
FGSM. However, the assessment limited to FGSM is not entirely reliable. Therefore, our method
is compared with many methods to obtain a more reliable experimental result.
7 Conclusion
This paper proposes a novel and more powerful attack method. We use a quadratic Taylor
expansion to approximate the input output mapping relationship of DNNs in a small
neighbourhood of the input example (using pL norms constraints) , replacing the nonlinear part
of DNNs. After that, the Lagrange multiplier method is used to construct the dual function for
optimization and calculate the extreme value to generate adversarial examples. This method can
efficiently generate a large number of effective adversarial examples at a small cost to solve the
inner maximization problem in the min-max optimization problem.
Experimental results on MNIST and CIFAR10 show that compared with the existing
classical attack methods, our method is more covert, more transferable, and can significantly
improve the robustness of DNNs through confrontation training. Compared with single-step
attack, our method has high transferability while maintaining the concealment of the sample.
Compared with iterative attack, our method can solve the internal maximization problem more
effectively and accurately. Therefore, our proposed method can be used as a benchmark to
evaluate the robustness of DNNs against opponents and the effectiveness of different defense
methods in the future.
In the future work, we will improve this attack method and extend it to cyclic recursive
neural network instead of the periodic neural network considered in this paper. We will continue
to study the root cause of the existence of the adversarial example, hoping to propose a more
robust DNNs training model.
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